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Abstract
When data are incomplete, a random vector Y for the data process together with
a binary random vector R for the process that causes missing data, are modelled
jointly. We review conditions under which R can be ignored for drawing likelihood
inferences about the distribution for Y . The standard approach of Rubin (1976) and
Seaman et. al. (2013), Statist. Sci.,28:2 pp. 257–268 emulates complete-data methods
exactly, and directs an investigator to choose a full model in which missing at random
(MAR) and distinct of parameters holds if the goal is not to use a full model. Another
interpretation of ignorability lurking in the literature considers ignorable likelihood
estimation independently of any model for the conditional distribution R given Y .
We discuss shortcomings of the standard approach, and argue that the alternative
gives the ‘right’ conditions for ignorability because it treats the problem on its
merits, rather than emulating methodology developed for when the investigator is
in possession of all of the data.
Key words and phrases: incomplete data, missing data, ignorable, ignorability, miss-
ing at random, distinctness of parameters, likelihood theory.
1 Introduction
Missing data are a common problem in empirical research, and particularly so in medical
and epidemiological studies. A central feature of the statistical methods for dealing with
incomplete data pertains to conditions under which the random vector for the process
causing the missing data need not be modelled. The modern framework was introduced
by Rubin (1976). If Y is a random vector representing the data generation process,
Rubin (1976) introduced the concept of modelling missingness through a corresponding
binary random vector R of the same dimension as Y , together with a joint probability
distribution for (Y,R). The realisations of Y comprise complete data, both observed
and unobserved, and realisations of R determine which values of Y are observed and
which are missing. The conditional distribution for R given Y represents the process
that causes missing data, herafter called the missingness process.
Given a model of joint densities for (Y,R), Rubin (1976) identified conditions on the
model for which the same inferences result whether the full model is used or the model
for the missingness proces is discarded. Rubin considered direct likelihood, Bayesian
and sampling distribution paradigms, but not frequentist likelihood inference specifi-
cally. Seaman et. al. (2013) reviewed use of the ignorability conditions in the literature
to promote unity amongst writers, and adapted Rubin’s conditions specifically for fre-
quentist likelihood inference. We refer to the conditions derived in these works as the
standard conditions for ignorabiliy.
Seaman et. al. (2013, p. 266) identified an alternative interpretation of ignorabilty lurk-
ing in the literature. This approach treats ignorable likelihood as an estimation process
in its own right, independently of any model for the missingness process. Our aim is to
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review the two approaches, to explain some shortcomings of the standard approach, and
to argue that the alternative interpretation gives the ‘right’ conditions for ignorability
because it treats the problem on its merits, rather than adopting methodology developed
for when the investigator is in possession of all of the data.
2 Ignorability for direct likelihood inference (Rubin, 1976)
We retain the notation Y and R from Section 1. The starting point for ignorability in
the sense of Rubin (1976) is a (full) model of joint densities for (Y,R):
Mg = { fθ(y) gψ(r|y) : (θ, ψ) ∈ ∆ }. (1)
If Θ and Ψ are the images of the projections (θ, ψ) 7→ θ and (θ, ψ) 7→ ψ, respectively,
then the data model of Mg is
Ms = { fθ(y) : θ ∈ Θ } (2)
and the missingness model is { gψ(r|y) : ψ ∈ Ψ }. We call each density in the
missingness model a missingness mechanism. Recall from Section 1 that the two
conditions under which the missingness model could be discarded and identical direct
likelihood inferences drawn from a model for the observed data derived from (2) were
called MAR and distinctness of parameters. We consider these in turn.
Given a realisation (y, r) of the random vector (Y,R), let yob(r) and ymi(r) denote the
vectors of observed and missing components of y, respectively. Analysis of the observed
data (yob(r), r) then proceeds by restriction of the random vector (Y,R) to the event
{ (y∗, r∗) : r∗ = r and yob(r)∗ = yob(r) } (3)
comprising all datasets y∗ (together with r) which correspond to (y, r) on the observed
data values yob(r) but may differ on the unobserved values ymi(r). A missingness mecha-
nism gψ(r|y) is called missing at random (MAR) with respect to (y, r) if gψ(r|y) is a
constant function on the set (3), where g is considered to be a function of y with r held
fixed. Rubin (1976) defined missing at random to be a property of the full model (1) by
requiring each density in the model to be MAR with respect to (y, r). The terminology
realised MAR was introduced in Seaman et. al. (2013) to distinguish this weaker form
of MAR from a stronger form more suited to frequentist likelihood inference: a missing-
ness mechanism is called everywhere MAR if it is realised MAR with respect to all
possible data vectors and response pattens, (y, r), not just the realised pair representing
the observed and missing data.
The second of Rubin’s conditions, distinctness of parameters, requires the pa-
rameter space ∆ of (1) to be a direct product ∆ = Θ×Ψ of parameter spaces Θ of the
data model and the missingness model.
If every missingness mechanism in (1) is realised MAR with respect to the realised
data vector y and response pattern r, then the likelihood function for that part of (1)
pertaining to the observable data factorizes as
Lg(θ, ψ) =
∫
fθ(y) gψ(r|y) dymi(r) = gψ(r|y)
∫
fθ(y) dy
mi(r) . (4)
If, in addition, distinctness of parameters holds for (1), then the (maximal) domain of
each mapping θ 7→ Lg(θ, ψ) is the same for every value of ψ, and likelihood estimates
for θ can be obtained by maximising the simpler function
Ls(θ) =
∫
fθ(y) dy
mt(r) . (5)
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over its full domain. We refer the reader to Rubin (1976), Seaman et. al. (2013) and
Mealli and Rubin (2015) for additional details.
An aside. In (5) we have used ymt(r) instead of ymi(r) to denote the unobserved
variables because overlaying the response pattern r onto the marginal distribution for Y
involves a different relationship between R and Y compared to (Y,R). The former does
not respect the stochastic relationship encoded in the random vector (Y,R) because it
involves holding R fixed and allowing the marginal distribution for Y to vary. The ‘t’ in
ymt(r) can be interpreted to mean ‘these are the variables of the marginal distribution
for Y that were missing this time.’ Note also that we do not do the same on the right
hand side of (4) because the set being integrated over is all of R × Y, whereas in (5) it
is only Y . See Galati (2019) for further details.
It is helpful to view the two ignorability conditions, MAR and distinctness of param-
eters, in a hierarchy as follows:
(a) Does the investigator wish to enforce a relationship ∆ ( Θ×Ψ between θ and ψ
for models (1) when estimating θ? If so, the analyst has no option but to consider
only full models for which distinctness of parameters does not hold, irrespective
of whether of not densities in the model are realised MAR.
(b) If the answer to (a) is no, then is every missingness mechanism in the model (1)
realised MAR? If so, the analyst can discard the missingness mechanisms from the
model.
Viewed in this way, ignorability for direct likelihood inferences is seen to be comprised
of two components, the distinctness of parameters criterion, which really is just a state-
ment that the investigator has no relationship of the form ∆ ( Θ × Ψ to enforce when
estimating θ, and the MAR component, which establishes the relationship between (4)
and (5) for fixed ψ.
Note also this does not mean that the MAR condition is of no use when a relationship
of the form ∆ ( Θ × Ψ is enforced (that is, when distinctness of parameters does not
hold). In this case, the MAR condition allows a likelihood L(ψ) = gψ(r|y) for the
missingness model to be maximised independently of θ, and then ∆ can be used to
determine an appropriate restriction on the domain of (5) for estimating θ.
We will call full models (1) satifying the distinctness of parameters and MAR criteria
ignorable models, and we emphasise that Rubin’s (1976) ignorability theory for direct
likelihood inference identifies a subset of models of the form (1), the ignorable models,
from which an investigator can choose their model if they wish to draw inferences for θ
free from the inconvenience of needing to model the missingness process explicitly.
3 Limitations caused by missing data
Ignorability is often presented as having something to do with drawing valid inferences.
For example, Rubin (1976, Summary) states that the ignorability conditions are “the
weakest general conditions under which ignoring the process that causes missing data
always leads to correct inferences.” ‘Correct inferences’ in this instance seems to mean
that inferences will be drawn from the correct likelihood given the chosen model. It has
nothing to do with whether or not the choice of model is valid for the given data, or
whether or not valid conclusions will be drawn from the data.
In the model-based paradigms, validity in the latter sense mentioned above is a
subjective assessment of the goodness of fit of the model to the data. If the model fits
poorly, then in some sense the inferences are not justifiable, and if the model fits too-
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well, then the model becomes more a description of the specific realised dataset rather
than a description of the process which generated the data.
When data are incomplete, the philosophy of the model-based likelihood paradigm
breaks down in two essential ways. Firstly, it is impossible to validate the investiga-
tor’s choice of missingness model against the data because the data required for this are
missing (Molenberghs et. al. (2008)). So consideration of a missingness model becomes
hypothetical in a manner analogous to the frequentist paradigm’s hypothetical assump-
tions about (Y,R). In the literature, this feature of incomplete data methods typically
is referred to as ‘untestable assumptions.’
The second way in which the paradigm breaks down is that it becomes impossible
to validate even a model for the observed data against the observed data. The reason
for this is a little more subtle. If the possible missingness patterns realisable from R are
r1, r2, . . . , rk, and these occur with marginal probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pk, then a density
f(y) for the marginal distribution for Y can be written as the mixture
f(y) =
k∑
i=1
pi p(y| ri) (6)
where p(y| ri) is the conditional density for Y given R = ri. If r1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) is the
pattern for a complete case, then p(y| r1) gives the distribution for the complete cases,
which may differ from the marginal distribution for Y given by f(y). And in general, for
the ith missingness pattern ri, the distribution of the y values realised with ri is p(y| ri)
and not f(y). Additionally, the distribution for the observed values realised with ri
is given by the marginal density
∫
p(y| ri) dymi(ri). This marginalisation stratifies the
distribution for Y into pieces of different shapes such that the complete data underlying
each shape typically is not distributed according to f(y), and the differing shapes makes
it impossible to mix them back together to recover f(y) via (6). The result is that the
observed data comprise a collection of subsamples from different distributions, no one of
which can be used to assess the fit of the data model, and the irregular shapes prevent
the subsamples from being pooled together.
To overcome the difficulties associated with checking the fit of the data model to
the observed data, we note that imputation-based methods combined with posterier
predictive checks have been considered, but we do not elaborate on these techniques.
The points we wished to make are summarised below:
(c) When carrying over a model-based philosophy to the case of incomplete data,
the types of hypothetical considerations typically rejected by these philosophies
become inescapable due to the impossibility of validating the fit of the missingness
model to the observed data.
(d) Validating the fit of the data model to the observed data becomes substantially
more complicated when the data are incomplete.
4 The middle road: When R is MAR
With any data analysis, the intention typically is to model the data to answer some sub-
stantive question under investigation. But incompleteness of the data impedes analysis
in two ways, the dataset has an irregular shape, and the underlying missingness process
can distort the distribution of the data that the investigator can observe. Methods for
taking these factors into account differ in their difficulty and inconvenience, and as a
matter of practicality, often methods that are less inconvenient are accorded priority
ahead of more difficult and inconvienient methods.
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Methods like multiple imputation overcome the irregular shape of the data by filling
in missing values with plausible values, and adjusting the precision of estimates accord-
ingly (Molenberghs et. al. 2015). A first step in creating imputations is often to consider
a model of the form (2) to model jointly the variables in the dataset. To estimate θ,
likelihood estimation might be employed. However, this estimation is further impeded
by the potential distorting effect of the missingness process on the distribution of the
observable data. The choice the analyst has at hand is to use ignorable likelihood esti-
mation based on (5) anyway, or to model the missingness process and base estimation
of θ on the left hand side of (4). Apart from the class of ignorable models, the latter
adds a substantial layer of complexity and inconvenience, and understanding conditions
under which this can be avoided is important.
In the situation just described, the primary concern is not in understanding the
conditions under which modelling the missingness process would be unnecessary, as
Rubin (1976) considered. Rather, the primary concern is simply to obtain an estimate
for θ, and to understand the conditions under which this can be done without the need
to consider models for the missingness process at all. This question cannot be answered
using the approach in Rubin (1976), reviewed in Section 2, because no model for the
missingness process is posited against which to compare the estimates from the ignorable
likelihood estimation.
Seaman et. al. (2013, p 266) note that it is this question that some writers seem to
have taken as their interpretation of ignorability. While these writers were considering
frequentist properties of estimation, the same ideas apply to direct likelihood inferences.
We elaborate on the details. Suppose that
h(y, r) = f(y)g(r|y) (7)
is a joint density for the random vector (Y,R), and consider the model
Mt = { fθ(y) g(r|y) : θ ∈ Θ }. (8)
By definition (8) is correctly specified for the missingness process. We can ask under
what conditions can the likelihood for the observable data for this model,
Lt(θ) =
∫
fθ(y) g(r|y) dymi(r) (9)
be maximised without needing to evaluate the unknown density function g(r|y)? If
g(r|y) is MAR with respect to the realised values (y, r), then (9) factorises in the usual
way
Lt(θ) = g(r|y)
∫
fθ(y) dy
mi(r) (10)
and (10) can be maximised without needing to evaluate g(r|y). Therefore, under this
MAR assumption about g(r|y), maximising (10) is equivalent to maximising (5). Hence,
if the investigator would have no reason to impose a relationship ∆ ( Θ × Ψ on the
parameters of a model (1), if such a model were to be considered, and if the investigator is
happy to assert that the missingness process itself is realised MAR, then direct likelihood
inferences for θ can be obtained by ignorable likelihood estimation without the need to
consider a model for the missingness process at all. In particular, considering some
hypothetical model (1) and asserting distinctness of parameters (that is, choosing an
ignorable model as the starting point) is simply unnecessary. We record this formally.
Theorem 1 (Missingness-model-free Ignorability). If the investigator would have no
reason to impose a relationship ∆ ( Θ×Ψ on the parameters of a model (1), and if the
distribution for the random vector R conditional on Y is realised MAR, then there is no
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need to consider models of the form (1) at all. In this case, direct likelihood inferences for
θ can be obtained by ignorable likelihood estimation, and this equates to the investigator
using the (unknown) conditional distribution for R given Y directly in the analysis.
When interpreting ignorability in this ‘model-free’ sense, writers typically have gone
further and adopted a frequentist view in which ignorable likelihood estimation retains
the asymptotic properties of likelihood theory (Seaman et. al. 2013, p. 266). For com-
pleteness, we review the conditions that would be needed for ignorability in this sense.
Recall from Section 2 that ignorability for likelihood inferences in the sense of Rubin
(1976) has two facets, with one being whether or not the investigator wishes to impose e
a relationship ∆ ( Θ×Ψ onto the estimation of θ. This consideration applies irrespec-
tive of the mode of likelihood inference, and we retain consideration of non-distinctness
of parameters as the first step in the decision making process. When this would be of
no interest to the investigator, a correctly specified ignorable model together with The-
orem 1 implies the investigator can dispense with consideration of the ignorable model,
and instead assert directly that R given Y is MAR.
For reasons explained in Seaman et. al. (2013), to consider frequentist properties of
likelihood theory, we strengthen our assumption to R given Y being everywhere MAR.
This is then sufficient for ignorable likelihood estimation to be valid in the frequentisti
sense of likelihood theory provided the additional hypotheses of likelihood theory are
satisfied. These requirements are summarised below.
The model for the observable data is obtained by removing from each vector in Y ×R
the coordinates pertaining to the missing values. This creates an irregularly-shaped set.
The probability measure on this irregularly-shaped set is obtained by pulling back events
in this set to unions of events of the form (3) in Y × R, and integrating the densities
in (8) over these corresponding events for (Y,R) (by applying iterated integrals as per
Fubini’s Theorem (Ash and Dole´ans-Dade 2000, p. 101)). In this way, the functions on
the right had side of (9) are seen to give a model of densities for the observable data.
By constuction,Mt is correctly specified if, and only if, f(y) ∈Ms. The integration
in (9) sets up a mapping from Mt to the observable data model. The observable data
model therefore will be correctly specified if, and only if,Mt is, and identifiable provided
Ms is identifiable (different values of θ correspond to different density functions fθ) and
the mapping to it fromMt is one-to-one. A sufficient condition for the latter to be true is
that the missingness process assigns non-zero probability to complete cases for all values
of y, since then densities (10) corresponding to different values of θ will disagree for at
least one y value on that part of the model pertaining to the complete cases. Finally,
the appropriate regularity conditions must be satisfied by Lt(θ), Θ and the value θ0 ∈ Θ
for which fθ0 = f .
We summarize this formally as follows.
Theorem 2 (Ignorability for frequentist likelihood inference). Sufficient conditions for
ignoring the missingness process when drawing frequentist likelihood inferences are:
1. there is no relationship ∆ ( Θ×Ψ (see (1)) to be imposed on the analysis,
2. the distribution of R given Y is everywhere MAR,
3. the additional requirements of likelihood theory (summarised above) are satisfied.
Moreover, when condition 2 holds, ignorable likelihood estimation equates to using the
(unknown) distribution for R given Y directly in the analysis. In these circumstances,
ignoring the missingness process is preferable to modelling it explicitly.
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5 Discussion
The foundations for ignorability of the process that causes missing data were put in
place by Rubin (1976). With the exception of a stronger form of MAR framed in Sea-
man et. al. (2013) for frequentist likelihood theory, these foundations have been accepted
essentially unaltered for more than four decades. Despite this, the conditions for ignor-
ability seem to be more confusing than they should be.
One reason for this might be that Rubin (1976) presented distinctness of parameters
as a mathematical requirement of ignorable likelihood estimation. We suggest that this
criterian is better understood from a statitistical perspective, namely, whether or not
the investigators wish to impose on the analysis a relationship ∆ ( Ω × Ψ between
the parameters for the data densities and the missingness mechanisms. From this per-
spective, non-distinctness of parameters is a choice of restriction incorporated in the
analysis by the investigator, not a mathematical requirement that makes ignorable esti-
mation ‘work.’ Moreover, the situations in which imposing such a restriction could be
considered reasonable would seem to be rare. In many cases, problems similar to defin-
ing statistical significance to be ‘p < 0.05’ would arise. We suggest that the condition
should be expressed as non-distinctness of parameters, and that it should serve more as
a footnote to the theory, rather than being given such a prominant place.
Another factor which may be contributing to confusion about the concept is the
linking of ignorability with notions of ‘valid’ inferences. For example, Rubin (1976,
Summary) communicates the implications of these conditions as “always leads to correct
inferences,” while Little and Rubin (2002, p 120) refer to inferences being “valid from
the frequency perspective,” and Seaman et. al. (2013, Abstract) simply refer to “valid
inference.” In these cases, what the terms mean is left undefined. However, linking
ignorability with validity of inferences at all would seem to be highly misleading because
ignorability is silent on whether or not a particular choice of missingness model is a ‘valid’
choice for the data at hand, and it is equally silent on whether the chosen data model
is ‘valid’ for the data at hand. So it is difficult to see that there can be any meaningful
sense in which satisfaction of the ignorability conditions implies that inferences drawn
from the model will be valid.
We suggest, however, that a primary source of confusion surrounding ignorability
is likely to be because, as framed, it is derived by emulating complete-data methods
without modification. Specifically, a full model for (Y,R) is taken as the starting point
for the model-based paradigms, and correct specification of the full model is added for
frequentist likelihood inference. These paradigms are predicated on the investigator
being in possession of the data to enable validation of the model against the data,
and this is not the case when data are incomplete. As discussed in Section 3, these
complete-data paradigms do not carry over completely to incomplete data because the
model for the missingness process cannot be validated against the data. This feature
of the incomplete data setting undermines the rationale for considering a model for the
missingness process as the starting point for an analysis.
Additionally, by framing ignorability in terms of properties of the model for the
missingness process, instead of in terms of the missingness process itself, the usual causal
link between choice of model and properties of estimation is partially severed. Changes
to the missingness model can be made without altering the ignorable likelihood estimator
in any way at all. While it is true that swapping one ignorable missingness model for
another merely results in a proportional change in the likelihood, this forces a user of
the tools to be in possession of unnecessary detail about the relationship between the
estimation process and some ‘hypothetical’ set of models for the missingness process.
Possibly the strongest argument against the standard conditions is the convoluted
nature of the way the question posed is answered. Specifically, for an investigator to
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choose not to use a full model, the investigator is directed to use a full model with
specific properties, when making any choice of full model at all is unnecessary.
The alternative interpretation reviewed and fleshed out in Section 4 avoids these
issues by making an assumption directly about the conditional distribution R given Y .
This has no analogue in the correponding complete data methods (which do not make
direct assumptions about the data random vector Y ). However, doing so is the most
direct and natural way to answer the ignorability question: the two scenarios under which
a full model is required are (i) R given Y is not MAR, or (ii) the investigator has prior
information about a relationship between the data distribution and missingness process
to incorporate into the estimation of θ. Otherwise, ignorable estimation is appropriate
because it equates to (the unknown) R given Y being used directly in the analysis.
Proponents of model-based paradigms might argue that the properties of (Y,R) can
never be known in reality. While it is true that the MAR assumption is ‘hypothetical’
(untestable), ascribing it to a model for R given Y has no advantages over ascribing it
directly to R given Y because it is impossible to validate this property for the missingness
model against the data. In short, choosing an untestable model is not an improvement
on making an untestable assumption, and comes with the disadvantages discussed above.
In relation to the ignorable models identified by Rubin (1976), the primary differ-
ence between the standard conditions and the alternative interpretation of ignorability
reviewed in Section 4 can be summed up as follows: in the former case, the ignorable
models are the full models that an investigator would choose from in order to not use
a full model; in the latter case, the ignorable models are the full models that can be
ignored because the need for an investigator to contemplate ever choosing one never
arises.
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